Bryn Mawr College

Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr College
German Faculty Research and Scholarship

German

2020

Merkel the German “Empress Dowager”? Reactions to the Syrian
Refugee Crisis in China and other East Asian Countries
Qinna Shen

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.brynmawr.edu/german_pubs
Part of the German Language and Literature Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
This paper is posted at Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr College.
https://repository.brynmawr.edu/german_pubs/33
For more information, please contact repository@brynmawr.edu.

Shen: Merkel the German “Empress Dowager”?

Merkel the German “Empress Dowager”?
Reactions to the Syrian Refugee Crisis in
China and other East Asian Countries
TRANSIT vol. 12, no. 2
Qinna Shen
When the Syrian refugee crisis rocked Europe in fall 2015, Angela Merkel prodded
her nation to take up the challenge (“Wir schaffen das!”). Subsequently, over a million
refugees entered Germany. Reactions to her momentous decision both within Germany and
in the world were deeply divided (Alexander, 2017; Steinbeis and Detjen, 2019). The influx
of refugees into Germany was vividly captured in a painting by a Chinese artist living in
Germany, Jiny Lan. In The Crown (Die Krone, 2018), Lan painted Angela Merkel wearing
a smug smile and a style of crown associated with royal women at the Qing Dynasty court.
In Lan’s depiction, the chancellor resembles the Empress Dowager Cixi—one of the most
powerful women in Chinese history, but also a leader with a contentious legacy (Figure 1)
(“Jiny Lan”).1

Fig. 1. The Crown (Die Krone, 2018) by Jiny Lan

A closer look reveals that the crown consists of a diverse group of people turned
upside down—the uprooted and displaced refugees who weigh heavily on Merkel. The
dangling ornament on the right of the headdress bears the colors of the German flag. Over
Merkel’s right shoulder appears the Chinese character 令 (ling), signifying an imperial
command or edict and alluding to Merkel’s “We can do it!” exhortation. The decorative
pattern that adorns the shoulders of the royal gown is actually formed by endless refugees
1
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climbing up from the southwest and southeast, the directions from which refugees came to
Germany.
The inspiration for this painting came from the artist’s ancestral history and
childhood memories. Jiny Lan is the granddaughter of a member of the last emperor’s
family. As a child, she saw her grandmother’s Manchu crown and asked her, “How could
a woman wear such a cumbersome thing?” Her grandmother replied, “It is an honor to wear
such a crown on the head.” What Lan wanted to convey in her portrait of Merkel was that
welcoming refugees won Germany honor and respect from other countries, but it also
imposed an onerous burden on the nation. As the artist observed, “The financial, moral and
cultural burden that the refugees place on Germany is enormous” (Zhang, “Germany
Gossip—Merkel or Cixi”; Zhang, “Mein Deutschland”). Lan falls back on her cultural
heritage and visual reservoir to illustrate the dilemma for Germany. Artistically, the
sinicized Merkel portrait is a compelling and unique creation and the fruition of cultural
hybridization. Ideologically, however, the exotic appearance of Merkel creates a
defamiliarizing effect that forces viewers to reexamine Merkel and her historic decision.
Because the refugees and Merkel (aka: Germany) are inverted, the portrait underlines the
tension between the two entities. The dangling status of the refugees might suggest that
Merkel is using them as political ‘ornaments’ to increase her own standing, but in a way
that ultimately makes her look ridiculous. The controversial Empress Dowager Cixi,
known as a femme fatale figure, was blamed for the fall of the Qing Dynasty. Lan’s
portrayal of Merkel as the German Cixi indicates her skeptical criticism of the chancellor,
expressing an almost alarmist characterization of Merkel’s refugee policy as a harbinger of
calamity for Germany.
Did the expatriate artist capture Chinese views of Merkel in mainland China and in
Germany? This article ventures to survey and analyze responses to the 2015 refugee crisis
from China and other East Asian countries, a region that is often sidelined in the discussion
of the crisis (Ostrand, 2015). Given the geopolitical and economic importance of these East
Asian countries, integration of this region into this important debate is long overdue. The
article turns to news coverage, social media posts, and microblogs in the German, English,
and Chinese languages. Its task is to sample the vast sources of information in order to
address questions that have not hitherto been discussed systematically: How did the
Chinese government and Chinese people in mainland China and in Germany respond to
the Syrian refugee crisis? What are some of the major reasons for a positive or negative
attitude toward accepting refugees into their country of residence? Does popular opinion
of Chinese people in each community align with the official policy of the country of
residence? How does German-Chinese popular opinion compare with German popular
opinion? Do expatriates tend to maintain the political views or foreign policies of their
native country, or do they adopt those of the host country? And can expatriates who endorse
the political views and foreign policies of host countries influence thinking in their native
countries at the official or popular level? In answering these questions, the article seeks to
bridge gaps between German studies, media studies, political science, Chinese studies, and
refugee studies. By way of conclusion, the article will briefly touch on the reactions in
Japan and South Korea to provide context and contrast. Using Germany as a reference
point, the article shows both differences and similarities between East Asian and German
responses. One major difference lies in the response of governments and the attitudes of
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their citizens toward welcoming refugees. The similarities are shown in the rise of racism
and populist nativism in these countries.

Chinese Government Opinions on the Refugee Question
As refugees thronged into Germany in 2015, Chinese Foreign Ministry
spokesperson Hong Lei was asked at a routine press conference on September 11, “Has
any other country asked the Chinese to accept Syrian and Iraqi refugees?” He did not
answer the question directly but indicated China’s general willingness to cooperate with
the European Union (EU) in addressing the refugee problem. He suggested that economic
development in the affected regions could fundamentally solve the refugee problem,
reflecting the official policy that also undergirds the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
(“Central Committee”; “What’s Wrong with ‘Standing with Refugees’?”). Merkel visited
China for the eighth time on October 28, 2015 in order to conduct trade negotiations as
well as seek help in managing the refugee situation. Premier Li Keqiang told her that the
Chinese government hoped for a diplomatic and political solution to restore stability in the
region, but he argued that it would therefore be necessary to combat poverty and promote
social and economic development in the affected countries (“Merkel erfolgreich in China”;
Delfs and Donahue, 2015; “Pressekonferenz”).
The German ambassador Michael Clauss said on May 5, 2017 at the embassy in
Beijing that the BRI “could make a significant contribution to alleviate the root causes of
migration. That’s obviously very important to us, because Germany is particularly affected
by the refugee crisis” (“Where the Rubber Meets the ‘Belt and Road’”). The New Silk
Road, another term for the BRI, constitutes a new reality to which most people must still
adjust. For instance, it is now possible for China to ship goods by rail to the regions where
refugees are residing. While researching the refugee situation in Germany in October 2015,
Liu Yiqiang, a lawyer of the NGO “International Law Promotion Center” (CIIL) that
initiated the “German Syrian Refugee Camp Research Project,” learned from officials in
Berlin that Germany was in urgent need of beds for refugees and had turned to the Red
Cross in America and Canada for help. Liu wondered, “Why didn’t Germany think of
asking China? The new Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe rail route stretches from Chongqing
to Duisburg and can transport goods from China to Germany within two weeks” (Zeng,
2015). China delivered aid worth over $40 million in the first half of 2017 to Syria directly,
as well as a total of 5,404 tons of rice to the northwestern city of Latakia, and provided
both personnel and material support in Syria’s reconstruction (Gao, 2017; “China Delivers
Food Aid to Syria”).
However, China’s commitment to humanitarian aid contrasts with its reluctance to
host refugees. Hua Liming, a former Chinese ambassador to Iran, said, “China has been
playing an increasingly active role in the Syrian conflict, but I don’t think China is
considering to provide shelter to people fleeing Syria or other war-torn Middle East
nations” (Shi, 2017). On June 23, 2017, while meeting with his counterpart in Lebanon,
China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi said, “Refugees are not migrants. The refugees
scattered around the world should return to their homeland and rebuild it. Not only is this
the wish of every single refugee, but it is also in line with the goals of international
humanitarian efforts and part of the UN Security Council resolution on the political
solution to the Syrian question” (“China: Flüchtlinge sind keine Migranten”). Wang’s
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assertion that returning to their homeland is the wish of every single refugee is the
boilerplate justification for the Chinese government’s own repatriation policy, which it
applied to 30,000 KoKang refugees from Myanmar in 2009, as well as to North Korean
and most recently Rohingya refugees. In Germany, only Deutsche Welle (DW) pieces
written by the Beijing-born columnist Zhang Danhong and conservative media such as
Tichys Einblick and Contra Magazin reported on Wang’s statement (Zhang, “Mein
Deutschland”; Steiner, 2017). The far-right newspaper Tichys Einblick explained that the
Chinese foreign minister’s clear statement should calm those tens of thousands of mainland
Chinese who had anxiously discussed on social media China’s possible embrace of Middle
Eastern refugees (“China: Flüchtlinge sind keine Migranten”).

Popular Opinion and Anti-Refugee Arguments in China
According to a Spiegel article published on May 19, 2016, Amnesty International
conducted a survey asking thousands of people from 27 countries whether they were
willing to accept refugees into their country, their city, and their homes. China topped the
Refugees Welcome Index, even outshining Germany. 94 percent of the Chinese said they
would welcome them into the country and 46 percent said they would welcome them into
their home (“Refugee Welcome Survey 2016”; “Amnesty-Index”; Drzymalla; Halloran).
This result is rather surprising and contradicts other polling results. According to a Douban
post published on October 22, 2015 by a blogger nicknamed Mr. Penguin, the majority of
netizens on Chinese social media were antipathetic toward refugees fleeing to European
countries, let alone to China. Mr. Penguin observed that in China it is considered
“politically correct” to mock Merkel as a Madonna or Virgin Mary figure and to ridicule
leftist thinkers in the West as baizuo (White Left). The derogatory term baizuo emerged
during the global rise of populist nativism and refers to liberal media, progressive
intellectuals, and celebrities (“Why Scolding ‘Virgin Marys’”).
On June 20, 2017, World Refugee Day, the UNHCR and Yao Chen, China’s first
Goodwill Ambassador to UNHCR, held a charitable event in Beijing, where the film
Welcome to Refugeestan (dir. Anne Poiret, 2016) was screened. The UNHCR posted on
Weibo that this event was to “pay tribute to the world’s 65.6 million people who are
displaced and homeless, and to pay tribute to all those who support and care for the
refugees” (Figure 2) (Koetse; “What’s Wrong”; Newhouse).2 Official Chinese media,
including People’s Daily and CCTV, also reported sympathetically on the refugees and
China’s contribution (“65,600,000 Refugees Expect Acceptance and Integration”).

Yao Chen is a mainland celebrity who dedicated herself to the refugee cause. She began working with the
UNHCR in 2010 and officially became China’s first Goodwill Ambassador to the UNHCR in 2013. She
had over 80 million Weibo followers, equivalent to Germany’s entire population, and she used her
influence to bring attention to refugees and to encourage donations from China to UNHCR. For example,
between 2012 and 2013, donations tripled from mainland China. Her appointment was renewed in 2017 for
another two years. “About Yao Chen,” UNHCR USA website.
2
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Fig. 2. UNHCR’s Weibo Message on June 20, 2017.

The Weibo post unexpectedly caused an internet uproar and received 29,774
predominantly negative comments versus 2,373 likes. Netizens assumed that the UNHCR,
Yao Chen, and the media, were all lobbying the Chinese government to accept refugees
from Syria and North Africa and thus resorted to social media and microblogs to preempt
such a move. An online news story falsely claimed that “Local people in Sanhe [in Henan
Province] confirmed it. It’s real. Refugees get free housing. They do not need to work. It’s
shocking, not just in Beijing, UNHCR has refugee settlements in more than 20 cities in
China. Refugees get allowances of over ¥3,000 per month” (“Let Germany Tell Yao Chen
What Becomes of Standing Together with Extremist Refugees”). Alarming and factbending posts and online trolls stoked people’s fear (“Let Germany Tell Yao Chen”;
“History Warns China”; Li; “Internet Rumor”; “Why Do Chinese Dislike Refugees?”). 3
Panic spread and anonymity allowed racist, nativist, and Islamophobic comments to
flourish (“What’s Wrong”).
One netizen took issue with the wording “pay tribute to the refugees” in the
UNHCR message: “I have always thought that those to whom we pay tribute either have
high morals or have made contributions to scientific and technological research. But the
UN wants us to pay tribute to the refugees, which I don’t understand. Just because they
have become refugees, they’ve become amazing? And deserve the respect of others? What
logic is this? Can the UN enlighten me?” (Figure 3) (UNHCR Weibo post, June 20, 2017).

Li, “Anti-Refugee Sentiment Rocks China.” The article falsely states that the city of Yiwu in Zhejiang
issued temporary residence permits to 9,675 foreigners in 2016, half of them from Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and
Afghanistan.
3
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Fig. 3. Post by an internet user in reaction to the UNHCR Weibo.

In comparison to the UNHCR post, which was liked only 2,373 times, this comment was
liked about 52,000 times.
A Weibo user launched an online poll, asking the public: “Would you like China to
accept refugees?” In a short period of time, 180,000 people voted but only 2.5% indicated
willingness to accept refugees (Figure 4) (“What’s Wrong”).

Fig. 4. A Weibo poll about public willingness to accept refugees into China.

On June 22, 2017, the Guangdong Communist Youth League conducted a similar online
survey but phrased the question slightly differently: “The Middle East refugees continue
to increase. Does the Chinese government have the responsibility to accept refugees?” Out
of 10,000 votes cast, only 51 people, i.e., 0.5%, agreed to “accept the Middle East refugees
because they are in need.” (“What’s Wrong”; “The Chinese Arrogantly Refused”; “China
Plans to Admit Refugees”; “Central Committee”). A word of caution needs to be said about
these online surveys and to what extent they accurately reflect popular opinion.
Respondents to online polls comprise a limited segment of the population, i.e. those who
have internet access and those who care enough about the issue to vote. Moreover, polls
are sometimes biased and are targeted at interest groups who have a strong emotional
investment in the issue. In this case, given that the Chinese administration was already
unwilling to accept refugees, this landslide disinclination to accept refugees had no
influence on politics, but it revealed the sentiments of a certain fraction of the public and
exposed the Islamophobia and racism of some bloggers and commentators. Many also used
the refugee situation as leverage to critique elements of China’s domestic policy, such as
the one-child policy, the BRI, and tolerance of domestic poverty.
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Similarly, while many Germans enthusiastically unfurled banners to welcome
arriving refugees in 2015, this euphoria was hardly shared by the Chinese community in
Germany. Many of them felt concerned or even alarmed (“Chinese in Germany Are
Worried”). According to DW’s Chinese-language site: “On Weibo, WeChat, and other
social media, we often see similar comments: ‘Be careful when you go out’; ‘Germany’s
Madonna Cancer’” (Wang, “The Refugee Problem”; “Do Germans Suffer from ‘Madonna
Cancer’?”). Chinese who had already settled in Germany adopted the position that “the
boat is full” (“How Has He Qinglian Demonized Merkel?”). The fear of competition
between different immigrant groups is not a new or rare phenomenon. In addition to raising
economic concerns, many Chinese in Germany dreaded social problems that might be
caused or exacerbated by refugees (“Chinese in Germany Are Worried”). Some others said
that although they did not oppose accepting refugees, the rapid admission of large numbers
of refugees since September 2015 had created a huge security hazard for the host society
(“Refugees Flooded into Europe”). Other complaints about the refugees were often related
to everyday inconveniences, such as waiting longer in line when registering for German
language courses (“Germany Has So Many Refugees”).
Analysis of the negative sentiments documented above yields a variety of
arguments against accepting refugees cited by the Chinese government and netizens.4 The
first major argument concerns the question of international responsibility for the Syrian
refugee crisis and relates to the Chinese critique of US foreign policy. The Chinese
government has long maintained that the US-led Western coalition has attempted to impose
its version of democracy on the Middle East by becoming involved in wars, directly or
indirectly, in Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, all of which have triggered waves of
migration both within these regions and into Europe. On the eve of Syria’s civil war,
People’s Daily (February 2011) criticized the US’s self-perception as a “protector” of Arab
citizens as a product of its arrogance and immoral superiority complex. In turn, the news
outlet contrasted this American paternalism with China’s call for the self-determination of
Arab citizens (Ren 269). In 2011, the Chinese government aligned itself with Russia and
vetoed three UN draft resolutions that threatened Syria with possible sanctions, marking a
shift from China’s usual pattern of abstention in the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) (Ren 263). The Syrian refugee crisis seemed to confirm China’s warning that
America’s purported protection of human rights and civilians would only cause a larger
humanitarian disaster (“Libya Conflict”). In an October 2015 opinion piece in People’s
Daily, Wu Sike, a former ambassador to Egypt and Saudi Arabia and former Special Envoy
on the Middle East, argued that the U.S. and Western agenda to “democratize” the Middle
East lies at the root of the refugee crisis (Liang; Huang and Li 69; Song, 2015, 45; Zhan).
Shen Jiru of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences also opined that it was not fair to
expect a developing nation like China to “clean up the mess” in Syria left by the US-led
coalition (Shi).
The second argument concerns the capacity of the Chinese population to
accommodate refugees in relation to China’s one-child policy. In reaction to the abovementioned UNHCR Weibo post, a netizen who nicknamed himself “Moustache Corporal”
and used a headshot of Hitler as his profile image brought up China’s one-child policy and
its draconian measures such as forced abortions, sterilizations, fines, and career penalties
Because of the global reach of the internet, it is not always possible to distinguish whether they were
posting from the mainland or overseas or both.
4
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(Figure 5). His choice of avatar was extremely provocative and suggests that he was a neoNazi or at least an online troller.

Fig. 5. Post by an internet user in reaction to the UNHCR Weibo post.

He wrote:
Don’t create an atmosphere conducive to receiving refugees. It is very disgusting and I
condemn it strongly. The government should not be overly magnanimous. If you do not
have that national power, do not accept refugees indiscriminately. You have enforced the
one-child policy for 30 years, not just to make space for other people. If you accept
refugees, how can you face the people of this country? How can you face those families
who have lost their only child? How can you face those women and families who were
forced to abort their baby? …

His view is similar to what another netizen wrote in a piece titled “China’s Family Planning
Is Not Intended to Make Room for Refugees.” That article was shared over 80,000 times
before it was removed and deleted by internet censors due to its inflammatory language
(“Internet Rumor”; “China Plans to Admit Refugees”). However, even a professor from
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Xi Wuyi, argued that if China starts to accept
refugees, “we are forced to give up our children to save space for foreigners.” (Wang,
“Why Do Chinese Reject?”). Because China’s one-child policy targeted only the majority
Han ethnic group, and not Muslim and minority groups, the debate stirred up old
resentment among Han Chinese toward Muslim refugees (Wang, “Why Do Chinese
Reject?”). However, despite the one-child policy, China has a huge population, which
means the country’s economy does not depend on immigrants or foreign migrants for labor,
as Germany’s does. Especially now that the government has relaxed its one-child policy,
China is more likely to rejuvenate its native population, resulting in a native-born labor
market that will be self-sufficient.
The third major anti-refugee argument stems largely from the idea that refugees
would add a financial burden to the host country. Some Chinese-language blogs I
encountered contain statistics showing how much each refugee would cost German
taxpayers per month. The authors of these blogs believe that these refugees are economic
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migrants who want to take advantage of Germany’s (also Sweden’s) generous welfare
system, which is why they did not want to stay in relatively poor Balkan and Eastern
European countries (“Sweden under the Scourge of the White Left”; “Why is Sweden More
and More ‘Dangerous?’”). Bloggers also brought up domestic poverty, pointing at the gap
between the rich and the poor in China. As one netizen wrote, China is the biggest
developing country and has its own impoverished population who “look as wretched as the
refugees” (“Should China Accept Middle Eastern Refugees?”). Another commentator,
equating Chinese economic migrants with refugees, remarked, “Helping [China’s poor] so
as to reduce the flow of refugees out of China and into the international community would
be China’s major contribution to reducing the world’s refugees” (“The European
Response”). As Lili Song, a professor of law at the University of Otago in New Zealand,
points out, China has ranked as a top-20 refugee-producing country every year since 2003
(UNHCR, Global Trends 2015, 56; Song 143).
Similar economic considerations led some critics to take issue with the
government’s magnanimity toward other countries. During a 2015 UN summit, for
example, President Xi pledged $2 billion and announced major debt forgiveness to assist
poor countries. The international community naturally welcomed the move, but domestic
critics complained about China’s “foreign-bound munificence,” arguing that the
government had overspent on international philanthropy when a large population at home
was still living below the poverty line (Liang). It is possible that this argument masks a
domestic critique of the BRI, President Xi’s signature project. Because open critique of
this major state initiative would be risky, the refugee controversy may have been exploited
as a proxy platform to debate domestic policy.
A fourth major argument surrounds security concerns. The series of terrorist attacks
and sexual assaults that rocked Europe in 2014–2016 was frequently attributed by netizens
to Muslim refugees and immigrants. Some of the victims were Chinese. A family of four
from Hong Kong were injured in the train ax attack in Würzburg carried out by an Afghan
asylum seeker on July 18, 2016 (“Condition of Hong Kong victim”; “Hong Kong victim”).
The Chinese student Yangjie Li was raped and murdered in Dessau in May 2016, but it
turned out that a young German couple committed this hideous crime (“Man sentenced”).
When two Chinese female students at the University of Bochum were raped in 2016 by a
32-year-old Iraqi refugee, one can imagine the panic such crimes caused in Chinese
communities (“Man jailed”). According to one article (“Chinese Students Abroad”), some
Chinese female students would no longer attend classes after four in the afternoon. They
used to carry pepper spray in their backpacks, but now they would hold it in their hands
while walking. If they went home late at night, a boyfriend or husband would pick them
up. The former sense of security had vanished, and netizens questioned Merkel’s refugee
policy more vehemently (Yu, “No Longer Feeling Secure”). Chinese-language social
media and microblogs were inundated with reports of terror attacks in Europe and rising
crime rates.
These reports played into the hands of authorities back in China. Chinese media
coverage of attacks in Europe reinforced government propaganda stressing that it was
necessary to adopt hardline measures against China’s own Muslim population in Xinjiang.
From 1990 onward, Uyghur terrorists carried out numerous attacks against civilians,
security forces, and (pro-) Chinese officials, and the Chinese government responded with
a ruthless crackdown on the Uyghurs (Tanner; Chung; “China Mass Stabbing”; Wayne,
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2008; Gohel). Thus, the refugee crisis fed preexisting domestic fears of terror attacks. The
government believed that terrorists connected with the Syrian opposition would infiltrate
Xinjiang and converge with separatist forces. The Chinese foreign minister highlighted the
alleged connection between militants from China’s Turkic and Muslim minorities and AlQaeda (Ren 271).
A fifth argument for not accepting refugees, and one that does not rest on blatant
Islamophobia, is that the refugees themselves do not want to come to China—a claim that
is also supported by the relatively small number of refugees from the Middle East and
Northern Africa who apply for sanctuary in East Asian countries. One commentator stated,
“To be fair, it is not that China has explicitly refused to shelter Syrian refugees or those
displaced by war and conflicts in the region. More importantly, refugees from the Middle
East usually choose Arab nations or developed countries, such as the US and Europe,
instead of China” (Shi). The Chinese language admittedly poses a barrier to adaptation and
integration, and Li Guofu, a Middle East specialist with the China Institute of International
Studies, stated that China was not an ideal destination for Middle Eastern refugees due to
religious, cultural, and political considerations (Shi). As for refugees already in China, they
are portrayed as unwilling to assimilate (Wang, “Why Do Chinese Reject”). It is difficult
for Muslims to defend themselves against rumors and perceptions.
Finally, widespread anti-refugee sentiments in the rest of the world – frequently
propagated by right-wing populist parties – have swayed public opinion. Chinese
microbloggers often repeat the rhetoric of conservative politicians in Hungary and Poland,
affiliates of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and movements such as Patriotic
Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident (PEGIDA). Anti-refugee articles
reporting on, for example, 550,000 rejected asylum seekers who still live in Germany, or
on corruption and profiteering among those responsible for settling refugees and managing
refugee camps, have been translated from Western languages into Chinese and circulated
online (“550.000 abgelehnte Asylbewerber”; Dassen, “Asylindustrie”; Dassen, “A Hidden
and Filthy Refugee Industry”). Videos of common citizens, such as of an old lady in
Hamburg vehemently relaying her anti-refugee arguments, were broadcast on Chinese
websites with subtitles (“Germany Has So Many Refugees”).
He Qinglian, a Chinese-American blogger for Voice of America, wrote a dozen
Chinese-language articles demonizing Merkel and the so-called “white left” in the West
(He). He’s writings are a quintessential example of post-truth and populist blogging. Two
other Chinese bloggers challenged He, pointing out the misleading examples, deceptive
logic, and ridiculous arguments in He’s diatribes; the bloggers were subsequently attacked
by He on Twitter (“How Has He Qinglian Demonized Merkel?”). This is just one example
of how Chinese communities were divided on the refugee question.
The views of some vocal Chinese netizens appeared closer to those of populist
right-wing parties, conservative politicians, and anti-refugee factions or individuals in
Europe. In any case, some Chinese netizens believed that leftist politicians in Germany
welcomed refugees as a political strategy because descendants of these refugees would
never vote conservative (“Has China Accepted Refugees Before?”). But the political selfinterest of the “white left” would lead to the “Islamization of German society” and “the
imminent demise of European civilization,” and ultimately to the creation of a new
caliphate: “Europastan,” “Deutschstan,” or “Francistan” (Wang, “The Refugee Problem”).
On bbs, a microblog site popular among overseas Chinese, another Chinese émigré

Shen: Merkel the German “Empress Dowager”?
Transit 12.2 / 2020 | 33
published an opinion piece that labeled Merkel as the “Female Hu Yaobang” (“Shoot
Yourself in the Foot”). Hu was the Party Secretary whose death sparked the 1989
Tiananmen student protests. Hu was known for having implemented the most tolerant and
relaxed policies toward the Uyghurs and Tibetans since the Communist reign in China.
Some praised his pro-minority policies as having a stabilizing effect on those regions in
the 1980s, whereas others blamed him for planting the seeds for separatism and terrorism
(“Hu Yaobang’s Xinjiang Policy”; “Should Anyone Dare to Advocate Hu Yaobang’s
Ethnic Policies?”). The blogger who compared Merkel to Hu was criticizing her tolerant
policies toward Muslims as historical and political mistakes.

Pro-Refugee Arguments in China
As in many other nations, the refugee crisis was a polarizing topic in China and
within overseas Chinese communities. In various Chinese-language outlets, writers
articulated the humanitarian as well as pragmatic reasons that led the German government
to accept refugees , but I will not repeat these views here (“Why Was Germany Willing to
Accept?”). Instead I will summarize some arguments advanced by Chinese netizens who
believed that China itself should admit refugees. Generally speaking, these writers
advocated compassion and tolerance for refugees, appealing to historical patterns and
human sympathy rather than to the nationalist or nativist sentiments commonly expressed
by conservative commentators.
A recurring pro-refugee argument is that many Chinese were once refugees
themselves and should be able to commiserate with the new refugees. From the 1950s to
the 1970s, over 100,000 Chinese fled Maoist China for Hong Kong, where residents not
only welcomed these refugees from the mainland but voluntarily protected them (He,
“Forgotten Stories”). In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many ethnic Chinese fled Vietnam
for other countries including France, Germany, and China (Li). According to UNHCR’s
“Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017,” the US, for example, received 17,400
asylum applications from China in 2017, contributing to a total of 89,500 pending asylum
cases from China.
Another pro-refugee argument points out that (overseas) Chinese have been victims
of racism, and so the Chinese should learn a lesson from history and not continue the
vicious tradition of racist expulsion (“Why Do Chinese Dislike Refugees?”). Hu Wenhui,
who has written on the history of discrimination against Chinese immigrants especially in
the US, warned other netizens of their inappropriate behavior. Hu pointed out that
Islamophobia is similar to the “Yellow Peril” rhetoric from over a century ago, only today
it is the Muslims who are dispersed around the world and living in diaspora. 5 In 2017, a
retailer at the Leipzig online store Spreadshirt, which provides a platform for vendors to
sell custom t-shirts, sold clothing with the catchphrases “Save A Dog, Eat A Chinese” and
“Save A Shark, Eat A Chinese,” causing outrage among Chinese communities. The
company dismissed the complaints, maintaining that the catchphrases were mere jokes that

Hu, “Knowing the History of the Suffering of Chinese Immigrants.” He also referred to the recent rap
video “Meet the Flockers” by the African-American rapper YG. The song advocated robbing Chinese
Americans, which provoked protest marches by Chinese in Philadelphia and created racial tensions
between African Americans and Chinese Americans.
5
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appealed to some people more than others (Xie). It finally stopped selling the t-shirts after
the Chinese embassy in Berlin got involved (Khoo; Herreria).
Some sober netizens denied that refugees posed any danger for Chinese in
Germany. A professor from Zhejiang University who was on a business trip in Germany
chastised fellow Chinese as “more nervous than Germans.” He observed that, despite the
recent attack in Munich, Berliners were celebrating Love Parade. He could not share the
anxiety of other Chinese in Germany: “Germans are, relatively speaking, a mature people.
The [Munich attack] was serious for administrators, and there are more police patrols and
police cars on the street, but average people are not too affected.” He admitted that judging
by social media, most of his friends and acquaintances, some of whom were applying for
German citizenship or were already naturalized citizens, were almost unanimously
opposed to the refugee influx (Zhao). Another sober-minded netizen also commented that
“The impact [of the refugee influx] is for real. But it is an exaggeration to suspect every
tree or bush as an enemy soldier.” He continued, “Except for a tourist friend who was
pickpocketed in Berlin, I have never heard of any other bad things that happened to people
I know. The real Germany is safer than the Germany portrayed on WeChat or Weibo”
(“Germany Has So Many Refugees”).
A fourth pro-refugee argument invokes universal values and China’s
responsibilities to the global community. The dean of Beijing Foreign Studies University’s
law school, Professor Wan Meng, said at a press conference on the “Syrian Refugee Crisis
Investigation Report,” held by the NGO “International Law Promotion Center” (CIIL) on
November 2, 2015: “Refugees are in fact far away from us, however, they are also very
close. Why? The world’s affairs are China’s affairs. China’s affairs are also the world’s
affairs. China has 1.4 billion of a world population of 7 billion. China’s GDP is the second
largest in the world. Chinese people are everywhere in the world and we should carry
responsibilities” (Zeng). This Chinese NGO conducted field work on Syrian refugee camps
in Germany from October 15 to 19, 2015, and according to their research report, the refugee
crisis posed a potential burden for China, yet it also provided a rare opportunity for
increasing diversity in Chinese society. Seizing this opportunity at the right time would
fundamentally strengthen the relationship between China and the world and would allow
China to evolve from a nation state into a “world-class country”; the report maintained this
was a responsibility that China could not dodge and an opportunity for China to rise (Zeng).
Moritz Rudolf and Angela Stanzel have also argued that more financial aid from Beijing
to curb the refugee crisis would be a “low cost, low risk engagement,” especially when
compared to the billions of U.S. dollars China has pledged to the BRI; indeed, it could turn
out to be a great PR coup for Beijing. Arguments such as these assert that supporting
refugees is not only the right moral decision but can be mutually beneficial in the long run.
***
This article has surveyed media and web sources to showcase official as well as
popular responses from online communities primarily in mainland China and in Germany.
Ultimately, the Chinese government has a tendency to adopt economic solutions for what
Westerners frame as political problems. Although popular opinion both in China and within
Germany’s Chinese communities is divided on the refugee question, there is little interest
in building a Willkommenskultur. Islamophobic as well as non-Islamophobic arguments
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against hosting refugees have gained mainstream acceptance. Anti-Muslim sentiments in
China feed on accounts from Europe, and Chinese media have encouraged the public to
support national security measures in order to prevent China from becoming another
Europe seemingly sinking into chaos. At the same time, the Syrian refugee crisis is also
invoked as a rhetorical device to criticize domestic policies in China. As shown here, the
massive influx of new immigrant groups led Chinese expatriates in Germany to distance
themselves from Merkel’s impactful refugee policy. Their political views tended to
converge with those of Merkel’s critics both in the government and among the right-leaning
populace. As Jiny Lan’s portrait illustrates, even though Merkel was at the height of her
political power, her popularity suffered in the wake of the open-door policy. The portrait
is now hanging in the office of none other than the FDP Chairman Christian Lindner, who
refused to build a Jamaica coalition with Merkel after the 2017 election. Whereas Lindner
certainly would not hang a conventional portrait of Merkel in his office, the outlandish,
Chinese-inflected portrait of Merkel in the image of the Empress Dowager was provocative
and interesting for a politician like him. Lindner found it “fascinating to hang in his office
this portrait of the Chancellor in such a tantalizing artistic representation, infused with a
message and associated with an empress who has the power to command unconditional
obedience” – obedience that his party was not willing to deliver (Zhang, “Mein
Deutschland”). The portrait itself forms an hourglass shape and invites inversion (Figure
6). Lindner said jokingly, “This artwork is a kind of mood indicator. Maybe others could
tell my mood in the future by how the picture is hung” (Zhang, “Mein Deutschland”). Lan’s
presentation of her artwork to an opponent of Merkel further indicates her alliance with
critics of Merkel.

Fig. 6. FDP Chairman Christian Lindner accepted Jiny Lan’s portrait for his office (2018).

The apocalyptic equation of Merkel and the Empress Dowager Cixi taps into the fear that
the end of Germany is near, evident in neologisms such as “Europastan” and
“Deutschstan.” Vis-à-vis the Syrian refugee crisis, the expatriates have not swayed the
public views of their country of origin in favor of the official policy of their country of
residence. In fact, through their negative social media posts about the refugee influx, they
may have reinforced mainlanders in their convictions.
The refugee issue is an ongoing one. Merkel made it clear that helping refugees
was no mistake, since the alternatives in 2015 were probably worse, but nobody,
including Merkel, wants a repetition of 2015. In 2019, when 12,000 refugees were
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lingering in the Balkan region, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, the CDU president at the
time, reassured constituents that “everything will be done so that 2015 does not repeat
itself” (Graw). As this article is about to appear, in March 2020, throngs of refugees are
stranded at the Turkey-Greece border, awaiting entrance to Germany and other European
countries. This time, Merkel made known that the “loss of control” (Kontrollverlust) of
2015 should not be repeated (Riegert). The majority of German politicians no longer
want Germany to singlehandedly intervene on behalf of the refugees (Hille). Merkel no
longer appears as an empress giving out orders (令 ling) as in 2015; instead, she wants to
coordinate with other European states before taking action.

Coda: East Asian Responses to the Refugee Crisis
China, Japan, and South Korea are all signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention
and the 1967 Protocol. The three governments as well as private donors in these countries
have contributed financially and otherwise to alleviate the refugee situation. Japan
consistently ranked among the top five donors to UNHCR, and China’s contributions
increased annually in the past five years, though it still lags behind its East Asian neighbors
(“Contributions to UNHCR”). Yet, both Japan and South Korea have maintained extremely
strict procedures for accepting refugees, including a very long and slow vetting process,
despite the rising number of applicants. During the onset of the refugee crisis, Japanese
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said on September 22, 2015 that his nation must attend to the
needs of its own citizens before opening its doors to refugees (“Japan Says It Must Look
after Its Own”). Bureaucratic hurdles also make it almost impossible for applicants to
receive legal refugee status (“UNHCR Asylum Trends 2013”; “No Entry”; Murai; Craft;
Lee; “Japan Rejected over 99%”; “Not Welcome”). The Japanese government defines
refugees as those who are individually targeted and persecuted, regardless of whether they
belong to a persecuted minority or are fleeing war or conflict. Japan also requires that
refugees apply in person and present valid identification cards. Japan fears that if it starts
admitting more refugees, it would set a precedent for potential refugees from North Korea.
Accepting refugees could nevertheless be a win-win situation for Japan because, like
Germany, Japan is a wealthy nation with a falling birthrate and a shortage of labor
(McCurry). In Japan, pro-refugee marchers carried signs such as “Refugees Welcome” or
“No One Is Illegal” (McCurry; “Japan”). In South Korea, a very low percentage of
applicants is granted refugee status, for example, 1.5% in 2017 (Rich and Bison). Similar
to what the West German government did for East German escapees before the fall of the
Berlin Wall, South Korea automatically grants citizenship to North Korean defectors who
flee to South Korea. South Korea is committed to accepting refugees from their northern
neighbor, but not from elsewhere (Lee). When 561 Yemeni refugees arrived at the visafree resort island of Jeju in 2018, there arose a political crisis in South Korea (Park; Hirst).
There are encouraging signs that these countries are becoming more engaged in the
global refugee crisis and have been making legislative and administrative efforts to regulate
the procedure. South Korea is the first country in East Asia to have introduced a Refugee
Act, and both South Korea and Japan have implemented legislation on relocating refugees
(Lee 4). The Chinese government has delegated the responsibility for screening refugees
to the UNHCR office in Beijing (“The European Response”). As Lili Song pointed out,
China gradually emerged as a transit country and destination for refugees and included for
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the first time in Chinese law, its 2012 Law on Exit–Entry Administration, an article on
treatment of refugees (160). Although these East Asian countries admit few refugees
officially, they allow a much greater number of asylum seekers to remain on their soil
temporarily, out of humanitarian considerations. But the East Asian countries could learn
from Germany’s example in improving their legal framework for determining refugee
status and offering subsequent support for the social integration of asylum seekers. In so
doing, East Asian countries would duly assume a greater share of humanitarian
responsibilities, as befits their economic and political stature in the world.
***
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